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Abstract
Philip Reny's approach to games with discontinuous utility functions can work outside its original
context. The existence of Nash equilibrium, as well as the possibility to approach an equilibrium
with a nite individual improvement path, are established, under a condition slightly weaker than
the better reply security, for three classes of strategic games: potential games, games with strate-
gic complementarities, and aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions. MSC2010
Classication: 91A10; JEL Classication: C 72.
Key words: better reply security; Nash equilibrium; potential game; game with strategic comple-
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1 Introduction
Reny (1999) made a signicant step in the development of sucient conditions for Nash equilibrium
existence in games with discontinuous utility functions. A feature common to games considered by
Reny and most of his followers, see, e.g., McLennan et al. (2011) or Prokopovych (2013), is that the
strategy sets are convex and each utility function is quasiconcave in own argument. Bich (2009) relaxes
the quasiconcavity, but not at all radically.
In this paper, we apply Reny's approach to three dierent classes of strategic games: potential games;
games with strategic complementarities; aggregative games with appropriate monotonicity conditions.
What unites them is that the existence of a Nash equilibrium in none of them has anything to do with
convexity. Moreover, it is much easier to prove and understand in the case of a nite game; in an innite
game, there may be no equilibrium at all without some continuity-like assumptions. And for each class
of games we obtain the weakest set of such assumptions known as of today.
Following Reny (2016), we consider games with purely ordinal preferences, i.e., where utility func-
tions take values from arbitrary chains rather than the real line. Inevitably, we only consider pure
strategies. Our (i.e., essentially, Reny's) topological assumptions do not ensure the existence of the
best responses; therefore, the standard xed point theorems cannot be applied directly. Instead, we
analyze the behavior of individual improvement paths and hence obtain more than the mere existence
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of a Nash equilibrium, viz. the possibility to come arbitrarily close to the set of Nash equilibria after a
nite number of individual improvements starting from an arbitrary strategy prole.
We understand potential games in a much broader sense than Monderer and Shapley (1996), viz.
we consider games where individual improvements are acyclic. Thus, our Theorem 1 generalizes the
main result of Kukushkin (2011), which in its turn generalized the good old \acyclicity plus open lower
contour sets" theorem (Bergstrom, 1975; Walker, 1977).
Strategic complementarities are also understood in a more general, ordinal sense, as in Milgrom and
Shannon (1994), rather than in the cardinal one, as in Vives (1990). Our Theorem 2 extends the main
result of Kukushkin et al. (2005) to innite games, even with some strengthening.
The observation that aggregation helps Nash equilibrium to exist can be traced back to, at least,
Novshek (1985), see also Kukushkin (1994). The assumptions we impose on aggregation rules in Theo-
rem 3 are taken from Jensen (2010).
Section 2 contains basic denitions and notations associated with a strategic game. In Section 3,
we reproduce Reny's basic notions and a bit more general topological condition, which, via a technical
Proposition 3, plays the key role in the rest of the paper. In Sections 4, 5, and 6, we consecutively
apply Proposition 3 to potential games, games with strategic complementarities, and aggregative games.
Several related questions of secondary importance are discussed in Section 7. More complicated (or just
tedious) proofs (of Proposition 1, Theorem 2 and Theorem 3) are deferred to Appendix.
2 Basic denitions
A strategic game   is dened by a nite set of players N and, for each i 2 N , a strategy set Xi, a
chain Ci (a utility scale), and a \generalized" utility function ui : XN ! Ci, where XN :=
Q
i2N Xi is
the set of strategy proles. For each i 2 N , we denote X i :=
Q
j2NnfigXj , and often use notation like
(xi; x i) 2 XN . Viewing functions ui as components of a mapping uN : XN ! CN , where CN :=
Q
i2N Ci,
we denote G the graph of the mapping, i.e., the set of pairs hxN ; uN (xN )i 2 XN CN for all xN 2 XN .
With every strategic game, we associate this individual improvement relation BInd on XN (i 2 N ,
yN ; xN 2 XN ):
yN BIndi xN 
 [y i = x i & ui(yN ) > ui(xN )];
yN BInd xN 
 9i 2 N [yN BIndi xN ]:
By denition, a Nash equilibrium is a maximizer of the relation BInd on XN , i.e., a strategy prole
xN 2 XN such that yN BInd xN holds for no yN 2 XN . The set of Nash equilibria is denoted E( )  XN .
A subgame  0 of   is a strategic game dened by subsets X 0i  Xi for all i 2 N and the restriction of
the utility mapping uN toX
0
N :=
Q
i2N X
0
i; we will use the notation  
0   . The individual improvement
relation in a subgame is the restriction ofBInd toX 0N . If xN 2 E( )\X 0N , then xN 2 E( 0); if xN 2 E( 0),
it need not belong to E( ).
An (individual) improvement path is a (nite or innite) sequence hxkN ik=0;1;::: such that xk+1N BInd xkN
whenever k  0 and xk+1N is dened. A strategic game   has the weak nite improvement property (weak
FIP) i, for every strategy prole x0N 2 XN , there is a nite improvement path x0N ; : : : ; xmN such that
xmN 2 E( ).   has the quasi weak FIP (QwFIP) i, for every nite subgame  0 of  , there is  00 such
that  0   00    and  00 has the weak FIP.
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Henceforth, the strategy sets Xi are assumed to be topological spaces; each chain Ci is endowed
with its order interval topology; the sets XN , CN , X i, and XN  CN are endowed with their product
topologies. For every xN 2 XN , we denote G(xN ) := fvN 2 CN j (xN ; vN ) 2 clGg (where clG denotes
the topological closure) and perceive G as a correspondence from XN to CN . We say that   has the very
weak FIP i, for every open neighborhood O of E( ) and every x0N 2 XN , there is a nite improvement
path x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N such that x
m
N 2 O. If   has the very weak FIP, then E( ) 6= ;: otherwise, the denition
should be applicable to O = ;, and xmN 2 ; is impossible.
Remark. Kukushkin (2011) dened the very weak FIP in a slightly dierent way: given a strategy
prole, there should exist a Nash equilibrium every open neighborhood of which can be reached after
a nite number of improvements. It remains unclear whether Proposition 3 would be valid under that
denition of the property; however, the question does not look pressing.
3 Better-reply security and nite deviations
First, we reproduce Reny's (1999, 2016) denitions. Player i 2 N can secure a payo of  2 Ci at
xN 2 XN i there exists yi 2 Xi such that ui(yi; x i)   for all x i in some open neighborhood of
x i. A game   is better-reply secure i, whenever xN is not a Nash equilibrium and vN 2 G(xN ), some
player i can secure a payo strictly above vi at xN .
Somewhat modifying Prokopovych's (2013) denition, we say that a subset Y  XN has the nite
deviations property i there is a nite set of pairs fhi(h) 2 N; yhi(h) 2 Xi(h)igh2H such that for every
xN 2 Y nE( ) there holds (yhi(h); x i(h)) BIndi(h) xN for (at least) one h. A game   is said to have the local
nite deviations property i, for every xN 2 XN n E( ), there is an open neighborhood of xN having
the nite deviations property.
Proposition 1. If a game   is better-reply secure and cluN (XN ) is compact, then   has the local nite
deviations property.
The statement is almost indistinguishable from Lemma 2 of Prokopovych (2013). Since our assump-
tions are much broader, a complete proof is given in Appendix, Section A.
Proposition 2. Let a game   have the local nite deviations property, and let Y  (XN n E( )) be
compact. Then Y has the nite deviations property.
Proof. By our assumption, there is an open neighborhood O(xN ) with the nite deviations property
of every xN 2 Y . Since Y is compact, it is covered by a nite number of those open neighborhoods.
Taking the union of the appropriate sets fhi(h) 2 N; yhi(h) 2 Xi(h)igh2H , we see that Y has the nite
deviations property indeed.
Proposition 3. Let a game   have both local nite deviations and QwFIP properties, and let XN be
compact. Then   has the very weak FIP property and hence possesses a Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let O  E( ) be open and let x0N 2 XN nO. Since XN nO is compact, it has the nite deviations
property by Proposition 2. Let fhi(h) 2 N; yhi(h) 2 Xi(h)igh2H be an appropriate nite set of pairs. For
each i 2 N , we dene X 0i := fx0i g[fyhi(h) j h 2 H & i(h) = ig  Xi. The sets X 0i dene a nite subgame
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 0 of  ; by our assumption, there is  00 such that  0   00    and  00 has the weak FIP. Therefore, there
is a nite improvement path x0N ; : : : ; x
m
N in  
00 such that xmN 2 E( 00). Now, we have either xmN 2 O or
xmN =2 O. In the rst case, we are home because x0N ; : : : ; xmN remains a nite improvement path in  . In
the second case, we would have xmN 2 XN nO  XN n E( ) and hence there would be h 2 H such that
(yhi(h); x
m
 i(h)) BIndi(h) xmN , which is incompatible with xmN 2 E( 00).
Since O  E( ) and x0N 2 XN were arbitrary, we are home.
4 Potential games
The relation BInd is acyclic i there is no nite improvement cycle, i.e., no improvement path for which
x0N = x
m
N with m > 0. A sucient condition for that is the existence of a generalized ordinal potential
(Monderer and Shapley, 1996), i.e., a function P : XN ! R such that P (yN ) > P (xN ) whenever
yN BInd xN . (For a nite game, that condition is also necessary.)
Theorem 1. Let   be a strategic game with compact strategy sets Xi. Let BInd in   be acyclic. Let  
have the local nite deviations property. Then   has the very weak FIP property and hence possesses a
Nash equilibrium.
Proof. Let  0 be a nite subgame of  . Since BInd is acyclic in  , and hence in  0 as well, every
improvement path in  0, if continued whenever possible, nds a Nash equilibrium at some stage. In
terms of Monderer and Shapley (1996),  0 has the nite improvement property (FIP); obviously,  0
has the weak FIP. Therefore,   has the QwFIP property and hence the very weak FIP property by
Proposition 3.
5 Strategic complementarities
We reproduce standard denitions useful for monotone comparative statics.
LetX and S be partially ordered sets (posets) and C be a chain. We say that a function u : XS ! C
satises the single crossing conditions (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994) i, for all x; y 2 X and s; s0 2 S,
there holds
[y > x & s0 > s & u(y; s) > u(x; s)]) u(y; s0) > u(x; s0); (1a)
[y < x & s0 < s & u(y; s) > u(x; s)]) u(y; s0) > u(x; s0): (1b)
u satises the weak single crossing condition (Shannon, 1995) i
[y > x & s0 > s & u(y; s) > u(x; s)]) u(y; s0)  u(x; s0) (2)
for all x; y 2 X and s; s0 2 S. Either condition (1) implies (2).
Let X be a lattice. A function u : X ! C is quasisupermodular (Milgrom and Shannon, 1994; LiCalzi
and Veinott, 1992) i, whenever y; x 2 X,
u(x) > u(y ^ x)) u(y _ x) > u(y); (3a)
u(y) > u(y _ x)) u(y ^ x) > u(x): (3b)
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Kukushkin (2013b) partitioned conditions (3) into four independent conditions, two of which will be
used here:
8x; y 2 X u(x) > u(y ^ x)) u(y _ x) > minfu(x); u(y)g ; (4a)
8x; y 2 X u(x) > u(y _ x)) u(y ^ x) > minfu(x); u(y)g : (4b)
A function u : X ! C is weakly quasisupermodular (Shannon, 1995; LiCalzi and Veinott, 1992) i
8x; y 2 X u(x) > u(y ^ x)) u(y _ x)  minfu(x); u(y)g ; (5a)
8x; y 2 X u(x) > u(y _ x)) u(y ^ x)  minfu(x); u(y)g : (5b)
These implications are obvious: (3a) ) (4a) ) (5a); (3b) ) (4b) ) (5b). Meanwhile, (3a) does not
imply (5b), and (3b) does not imply (5a).
Theorem 2. Let   be a strategic game such that each strategy set Xi is simultaneously a compact
topological space and a lattice. Let each utility function ui satisfy the condition (1a) with X := Xi,
S := X i, and C := Ci. Let every function ui(; x i) : Xi ! Ci (i 2 N , x i 2 X i) satisfy the condition
(4a). Let   have the local nite deviations property. Then   has the very weak FIP property and hence
possesses a Nash equilibrium.
Essentially, this theorem follows from Proposition 3 above and Theorem 1 of Kukushkin et al. (2005).
Since the assumptions of the latter theorem were somewhat stronger than those made here, a complete
proof is given in Appendix, Section B.
Theorem 20. Let   be a strategic game such that each strategy set Xi is simultaneously a compact
topological space and a lattice. Let each utility function ui satisfy the condition (1b) with X := Xi,
S := X i, and C := Ci. Let every function ui(; x i) : Xi ! Ci (i 2 N , x i 2 X i) satisfy the condition
(4b). Let   have the local nite deviations property. Then   has the very weak FIP property and hence
possesses a Nash equilibrium.
The proof is dual to that of Theorem 2.
6 Aggregative games
We call a strategic game aggregative i there are mappings i : X i ! R (i 2 N), aggregation rules,
and Ui : i(X i)Xi ! Ci (i 2 N) such that
ui(xN ) = Ui(i(x i); xi)
for all i 2 N and xN 2 XN . For each i 2 N , we denote Si := i(X i)  R. An aggregative game
is appropriately aggregative i each strategy set Xi is a poset, while there are mappings g : XN ! R,
Fi : Si Xi ! R and vi : X i ! R (i 2 N) satisfying the following conditions.
First, for all i 2 N and xN 2 XN ,
g(xN ) = Fi(i(x i); xi) + vi(x i): (6)
5
Second, each Fi has the strictly increasing dierences property (Topkis, 1978):
8si; s0i 2 Si 8yi; xi 2 Xi

[yi > xi & s
0
i > si]) Fi(s0i; yi)  Fi(s0i; xi) > Fi(si; yi)  Fi(si; xi)

: (7)
A straightforward example of appropriate aggregation is given by i(x i) :=
P
j 6=i xj (with Xi  R),
in which case g(xN ) :=
P
i 6=j xi  xj=2, Fi(si; xi) := sixi, and vi(x i) := 0 satisfy (6) and (7). Jensen
(2010) provides a number of less straightforward examples.
Theorem 3. Let   be an appropriately aggregative game such that each strategy set Xi is simultaneously
a compact topological space and a lattice. Let each Ui satisfy the weak single crossing condition (2) with
X := Xi, S := Si, and C := Ci. Let, for each i 2 N , there be si 2 Si such that Ui(si; ) satises (4a)
for all xi; yi 2 Xi and si < si , while satisfying (4b) for all xi; yi 2 Xi and si > si . Let   have the
local nite deviations property. Then   has the very weak FIP property and hence possesses a Nash
equilibrium.
The proof, based on Proposition 3 and a combination of ideas from Jensen (2010) and Kukushkin
(2016), is deferred to Appendix, Section C.
Theorem 30. Let   be an appropriately aggregative game such that each strategy set Xi is simultaneously
a compact topological space and a lattice. Let each Ui satisfy the single crossing conditions (1) with
X := Xi, S := Si, and C := Ci. Let, for each i 2 N , there be si 2 Si such that Ui(si; ) satises (5a)
for all xi; yi 2 Xi and si < si , while satisfying (5b) for all xi; yi 2 Xi and si > si . Let   have the
local nite deviations property. Then   has the very weak FIP property and hence possesses a Nash
equilibrium.
The proof is virtually the same as that of Theorem 3; only the reference to Proposition 26 from
Kukushkin (2013b) should be replaced with the reference to Proposition 28 from the same paper.
7 Concluding remarks
7.1. The description of the preferences of the players with \generalized" utility functions is equivalent
to the description with complete binary relations as in Reny (2016). An even more general description
would emerge if each Ci were just a poset. Theorem 1 would remain valid in this case with the same
proof, cf. Kukushkin (2011). Whether Theorems 2 and 3 allow such a broad generalization is not clear
at the moment; most likely, additional assumptions would be needed.
7.2. The compactness assumption in Proposition 1 cannot simply be dropped. If each Ci is just R, it
boils down to the condition that each ui is bounded, both above and below. The fact that the proposition
may become wrong without an upper bound on utilities may be demonstrated with a one-person game.
As to the lower bound, two players are needed, but one of them may be a dummy.
Example 1. Let us consider a game where N := f1; 2g, X1 := [0; 1], X2 := f0g, and the utility mapping
is this:
uN (xN ) :=
(
(1  x1; 1=x1); if x1 > 0;
(0; 0); if x1 = 0:
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The game is better-reply secure since the graph G of the utility mapping uN is closed and a payo
strictly above u1(xN ) is secured by any y1 2]0; 1[ if x1 = 0, or by any y1 2]0; x1[ if x1 > 0. Thus, all
assumptions of Proposition 1 are satised except that u2 is not bounded below. On the other hand, no
open neighborhood of (0; 0) has the nite deviations property; moreover, there is no Nash equilibrium.
As suggested by Reny (1999) himself, the proposition can be made applicable to unbounded utilities
via a re-interpretation of better-reply security. Namely, we could perceive uN as a mapping XN ! RN ,
where R := f 1g[R[f+1g, and require the inequality in the denition to hold for vectors in G(xN )
with innite coordinates as well. (It should be noted that R is compact in its order interval topology.)
In Example 1, G will no longer be closed under this interpretation, G(0; 0) = f(0; 0); (1; 1)g, and
player 1 cannot secure any payo above 1. In other words, another assumption will fail and there will
be no surprise in the absence of an equilibrium.
One could suspect the compactness assumption to imply that the preferences can actually be de-
scribed with a real-valued utility function. However, this is not the case: if Ci is R  f0; 1g with the
lexicographic order, then the closure of every bounded subset of Ci is compact, but its embedding into
the real line may be impossible (Wakker, 1988, Lemma 3.1).
7.3. The restriction of the main requirement in the denition of the nite deviations property to
xN 2 Y n E( ) (rather than all xN 2 Y ) was taken from Prokopovych (2013). As can easily be seen
from Section A, Proposition 1 would remain valid without such a restriction. One could argue that the
two versions of the denition only dier when Y \E( ) 6= ;, so it makes no sense to distinguish between
them when the sole purpose is to establish the existence of an equilibrium. Since the very weak FIP
we study in this paper is more than the mere existence, the fact that the weaker condition is sucient
might be worth noting.
7.4. Similarly to Kukushkin (2011), our Theorem 1 implies a new generalization of the old theorem
of Bergstrom (1975) and Walker (1977): An acyclic binary relation B on a compact topological space
X admits a maximizer if, whenever y B x, there is an open neighborhood O of x and a nite set
fz1; : : : ; zmg  X such that for every x0 2 O there is k for which zk B x0. Funnily, this particular
result seems to have never been published although there are quite a few of much more straightforward
generalizations in the literature.
7.5. The key role in the proof of Theorem 3 is played by a construction essentially invented by Jensen
(2010), who built on Huang (2002), Dubey et al. (2006), and Kukushkin (2005). Unfortunately, there
were technical oversights in Jensen (2010): the proof needed stronger assumptions than were made
explicitly (Jensen, 2012). In a personal communication, Jensen conjectured that his main theorem is
nonetheless valid as stated. Our Theorem 3 makes a signicant step towards the vindication of his
position.
Appendix: Proofs
A Proof of Proposition 1
Since   is better-reply secure, for every vN 2 G(xN ), there are j(vN ) 2 N , j(vN )(vN ) 2 Cj(vN ), yj(vN ) 2
Xj(vN ), and V j(vN )(vN )  X j(vN ) such that V j(vN )(vN ) is open, x j(vN ) 2 V j(vN )(vN ), j(vN )(vN ) >
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vj(vN ), and, whenever x j(vN ) 2 V j(vN )(vN ), there holds uj(vN )(yj(vN ); x j(vN ))  j(vN )(vN ). De-
noting W (vN ) := fwN 2 CN j j(vN )(vN ) > wj(vN )g, we have vN 2 W (vN ) and hence G(xN ) S
vN2 G(xN )W (vN ). Since every W (vN ) is open while
G(xN ) is compact, there are v
1
N ; : : : ; v
m
N 2 G(xN )
such that G(xN ) 
Sm
h=1W (v
h
N ) =:
~W .
Claim A.1. There is an open neighborhood V of xN such that uN (xN ) 2 ~W whenever xN 2 V .
Remark. In principle, this claim belongs to textbook material. Since our assumptions are broader
than usual, a complete proof is given.
Proof of Claim A.1. We set F := (cluN (XN )) n ~W  CN ; F is compact. For every wN 2 F , we have
(xN ; wN ) =2 G. Since G is closed, there is an open neighborhood V 0(wN ) of (xN ; wN ) in XN  CN such
that V 0(wN ) \ G = ;; without restricting generality, we have V 0(wN ) = V 0X(wN )  V 0C(wN ), where
V 0X(wN ) is open in XN , while V
0
C(wN ) is open in CN . Since fxNg  F is compact, it is covered by a
nite number of such neighborhoods: V 0(w1N ), . . . , V
0(wm0N ). We dene V :=
Tm0
h=1 V
0
X(w
h
N ); V is open
and xN 2 V .
Now if xN 2 V and uN (xN ) =2 ~W , we would have uN (xN ) 2 F ; therefore, hxN ; uN (xN )i 2 V 0(whN ) for
some h. Since xN 2 V 0X(whN ), we have hxN ; uN (xN )i 2 V 0(whN ) as well. Therefore, hxN ; uN (xN )i =2 G,
which is impossible.
Picking such an open neighborhood V , we dene O := V \Tmh=1[Xj(vhN )  V j(vhN )(vhN )]. Again, O
is open and xN 2 O. Setting H := f1; : : : ;mg, i(h) := j(vhN ) and yhi(h) := yj(vhN ) for all h 2 H, we check
that O satises the requirement.
Let xN 2 O; hence uN (xN ) 2
S
h2H W (v
h
N ) by Claim A.1 and hence  j(vhN )(v
h
N ) > uj(vhN )
(xhN )
for some h. Since x j(vhN ) 2 V j(vhN )(v
h
N ), we have uj(vhN )
(yj(vhN )
; x j(vhN ))   j(vhN )(v
h
N ) > uj(vhN )
(xhN ).
Thus, (yhi(h); x i(h)) BIndi(h) xN indeed.
B Proof of Theorem 2
In light of Proposition 3, it is enough to show that   has the QwFIP property.
Let  0    be nite; for each i 2 N , we dene X 00i as the minimal sublattice of Xi containing X 0i.
Then X 00i is still nite; hence we can argue similarly to the proof of Theorem 1 of Kukushkin et al.
(2005). We dene
X" := fxN 2 X 00N j 9yN 2 X 00N [yN > xN & yN BInd xN ]g; X# := X 00N nX";
yN  xN 


[yN 2 X# & xN 2 X"] or [xN ; yN 2 X" & yN > xN ] or
[xN ; yN 2 X# & yN < xN ]

: (8)
Clearly,  is irreexive and transitive.
Claim B.1. If xN 2 X 00N n E( 00), then there exists yN 2 X 00N such that yN BInd xN and yN  xN .
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Proof of Claim B.1. If xN 2 X", then we pick yN 2 X 00N such that yN BInd xN and yN > xN . If
yN 2 X#, then yN  xN by the rst disjunctive term in (8). If yN 2 X", then yN  xN by the second
disjunctive term in (8).
Let xN 2 X#. We pick i 2 N and yN 2 X 00N such that yN BIndi xN . Denoting Yi := fzi 2 X 00i j zi 
xig, we pick zi 2 Argmaxzi2Yi ui(zi; x i), which is possible because Yi is nite. Since xN 2 X#, yi > xi
is impossible. If yi < xi, then ui(zi; x i)  ui(yi; x i); hence ui(zi; x i) > ui(xN ) and hence zi < xi.
If yi and xi are incomparable in the order, then yi _ xi > xi and yi ^ xi < xi. An assumption that
ui(xN )  ui(yi ^ xi; x i) would imply ui(yi; x i) > ui(yi ^ xi; x i), and hence ui(yi _ xi; x i) > ui(xN )
by (4a), contradicting our assumption that xN 2 X#. Therefore, ui(yi ^ xi; x i) > ui(xN ); hence
ui(zi; x i) > ui(xN ) and zi < xi again. Denoting zN := (zi; x i), we see that zN BInd xN and zN < xN .
To show that zN  xN , we only have to show that zN 2 X#.
Suppose the contrary: there are j 2 N and yj > zj such that
uj(yj ; z j) > uj(zN ): (9)
Let us consider two alternatives.
If j = i (hence z j = x i), yi > xi would contradict xN 2 X# while yi < xi would contradict the
choice of zi; therefore, we have to assume that yi and xi are incomparable, hence yi _ xi > xi. The
choice of zi implies ui(zi; x i)  ui(yi ^ xi; x i) and hence, by (9) and (4a), ui(yi _ xi; x i) > ui(xN ),
contradicting the assumption xN 2 X#.
Thus, we are led to j 6= i; hence yj > zj = xj and z j < x j . Now (9) and (1a) imply uj(yj ; x j) >
uj(xN ), again contradicting the assumption xN 2 X#.
Finally, having x0N 2 X 00N n E( 00), we start building an improvement path, applying Claim B.1 at
each step, i.e., picking xk+1N 2 X 00N such that xk+1N BInd xkN and xk+1N  xkN , as long as xkN =2 E( 00). Since
 is an order, we cannot return back. Since X 00N is nite, we reach E( 00) at some stage.
C Proof of Theorem 3
In light of Proposition 3, it is enough to show that   has the QwFIP property. Let  0    be nite.
Exactly as in the case of Theorem 2, we dene X 00i , for each i 2 N , as the minimal sublattice of Xi
containing X 0i. Then X
00
i is still nite.
To establish that  00 has the weak FIP, we argue similarly to Jensen (2010) or Kukushkin (2016).
For each i 2 N , we dene the best response correspondence:
Ri(si) := Argmax
xi2X00i
Ui(si; xi):
Since X 00i is nite, Ri(si) 6= ; for each si 2 S00i .
By Proposition 26 from Kukushkin (2013b), and conditions (4a) and (2), the correspondence Ri is
weakly ascending in the sense of Veinott (1989):
[s0i > si & yi 2 Ri(s0i) & xi 2 Ri(si)]) [yi _ xi 2 Ri(s0i) or yi ^ xi 2 Ri(si)]:
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Therefore, by Theorem 3.2 of Veinott (1989), or, easier to nd, Proposition 2.5 from Kukushkin (2013a),
there exists an increasing selection ri from Ri. Henceforth, we x such a selection for each i 2 N and
denote X0i := ri(S
0
i). Clearly, X
0
i  X 00i is a chain.
Now, we introduce this admissible best response improvement relation BBR on X 00N (i 2 N , yN ; xN 2
X 00N ):
yN BBRi xN 
 [yN BIndi xN & yi = ri(x i)];
yN BBR xN 
 9i 2 N [yN BBRi xN ]:
Since ri(x i) is dened for every x i 2 X 00 i, every maximizer of BBR on X 00N is a Nash equilibrium in  00.
Since X 00N is nite, it is sucient to show that BBR is acyclic. We achieve this objective by producing
an order potential of BBR, i.e., an irreexive and transitive binary relation  on X 00N such that
8xN ; yN 2 X 00N

yN BBR xN ) yN  xN

:
For each i 2 N , we, henceforth, assume that S0i := i(X 00 i) = fs0i ; s1i ; : : : ; smi g with ski > shi whenever
k > h; for each xi 2 X0i , we dene {i(xi) := minfk j xi = ri(ski )g and
i(xi) :=  Fi(s{i(xi)i ; xi) +
X
k<{i(xi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))]: (10)
For xi 2 X 00i n X0i , we dene i(xi) arbitrarily, e.g., i(xi) := 0. For every xN 2 X 00N , we dene a set
N0(xN ) := fi 2 N j xi 2 X0i g and a function
H(xN ) := g(xN ) +
X
i2N
i(xi): (11)
Now, we are ready to dene our potential, a binary relation on X 00N :
yN  xN 


N0(yN )  N0(xN ) or [N0(yN ) = N0(xN ) & H(yN ) > H(xN )] or 
N0(yN ) = N
0(xN ) & H(yN ) = H(xN ) &
8i 2 N [yi = xi or yi  xi] & 9i 2 N [yi > xi]

: (12)
Obviously,  is irreexive and transitive.
Claim C.1. If xN ; yN 2 X 00N and yN BBR xN , then yN  xN .
Proof of Claim C.1. Let yN BBRi xN and i(x i) = s
k
i . We have yi = ri(s
k
i ) 6= xi by denition; hence
yi 2 X0i and N0(yN )  N0(xN ). If the inclusion is strict, we have yN  xN by the rst term in (12).
Let us assume N0(yN ) = N
0(xN ), i.e., xi 2 X0i . Taking into account (10), we can rewrite (11) as
H(xN ) =
X
k<{i(xi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))] + Fi(ski ; xi)  Fi(s{i(xi)i ; xi) + C(x i); (13a)
H(yN ) =
X
k<{i(yi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))] + Fi(ski ; yi)  Fi(s{i(yi)i ; yi) + C(x i): (13b)
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Let us assume that xi > yi; then {i(yi)  k < {i(xi). Subtracting (13a) from (13b), we obtain
H(yN ) H(xN ) = [Fi(s{i(xi)i ; xi)  Fi(s
k
i ; xi)] 
X
kk<{i(xi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))]
=
X
kk<{i(xi)

[Fi(s
k+1
i ; xi)  Fi(ski ; xi)]  [Fi(sk+1i ; ri(ski ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))]

:
By (7), the dierence is strictly positive. Therefore, yN  xN by the second term in (12).
Now let us assume that xi < yi; then {i(xi) < {i(yi)  k. Subtracting (13a) from (13b), we obtain
H(yN ) H(xN ) =X
{i(xi)k<{i(yi)
[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))] + [Fi(ski ; yi)]  Fi(s{i(yi)i ; yi)  [Fi(s
k
i ; xi)  Fi(s{i(xi)i ; xi)]
=
X
{i(xi)k<{i(yi)

[Fi(s
k+1
i ; ri(s
k
i ))  Fi(ski ; ri(ski ))]  [Fi(sk+1i ; xi)  Fi(ski ; xi)]

+

[Fi(s
k
i ; yi)  Fi(s{i(yi)i ; yi)]  [Fi(s
k
i ; xi)  Fi(s{i(yi)i ; xi)]

:
By (7), the dierence is non-negative; it can only be zero if {i(yi) = k = {i(xi) + 1. Thus, yN  xN by
the second or the third term in (12).
To summarize, we established that the admissible best response improvement relation BBR is acyclic
on X 00N . Starting from x
0
N 2 X 00N an admissible best response improvement path in  00, we inevitably
reach a Nash equilibrium at some stage. Therefore,  00 has the weak FIP.
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